Efficient methods for near-optimal sequential decision making under uncertainty by Dimitrakakis, C.
Efficient Methods for Near-Optimal Sequential
Decision Making Under Uncertainty∗
Christos Dimitrakakis
April 20, 2010
Abstract
This chapter discusses decision making under uncertainty. More specifically, it
offers an overview of efficient Bayesian and distribution-free algorithms for mak-
ing nearly-optimal sequential decisions under uncertainty about the environment.
Due to the uncertainty, such algorithms must not only learn from their interaction
with the environment, but also perform as well as well as possible while learning
is taking place.
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1 Introduction
It could be argued that automated decision making is the main application domain
of artificial intelligence systems. This includes tasks from selecting moves in a
game of chess and choosing the best navigation route in a road network to re-
sponding to questions posed by humans, playing a game of poker and exploring
other planets of the solar system. While chess playing and navigation both involve
accurate descriptions of the problem domain, the latter problems involve uncer-
tainty about both the nature of the environment and its current state. For example,
in the poker game, the nature of the other players (i.e. the strategies the use) is not
known. Similarly, the state of the game is not known perfectly – i.e. their cards are
not known, but it might be possible to make an educated guess.
This chapter shall examine acting under uncertainty in environments with state,
wherein a sequence of decisions must be made. Each decision made has an effect
on the environment, thus changing the environment’s state. One type of uncer-
tainty arises when it is not known how the environment works, i.e. the agent can
observe the state of the environment but is not certain what is the effect of each
possible action in each state. The decision making agent must therefore explore
the environment, but not in a way that is detrimental to its performance. This bal-
ancing act is commonly referred to as the exploration-exploitation trade-off. The
chapter gives an overview of current methods for achieving nearly optimal online
performance in such cases.
Another type of uncertainty arises when the environment’s state can not be
observed directly, and can only be inferred. In that case, the state is said to be hid-
den or partially observable. When both types of uncertainty occur simultaneously,
then the problem’s space complexity increases polynomially with time, because we
must maintain all the observation history to perform inference. The problem be-
comes even harder when there are multiple agents acting within the environment.
However, we shall not consider this case in this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we give an intro-
duction to inference and decision making under uncertainty in both the Bayesian
and distribution-free framework. Section 3 introduces some sequential decision
making problems under uncertainty. These problems are then formalized within
the framework of Markov decision processes in Section 4, which can be used to
make optimal decisions when the uncertainty is only due to stochasticity, i.e. when
the effects of any decisions are random, but arise from a known probability distri-
bution that is conditioned on the agent’s actions and the current state. Section 5
discusses the extension of this framework to when these probability distributions
are not known. It is shown that the result is another Markov decision process with
an infinite number of states and various methods for approximately solving it are
discussed. When the states of the environment are not directly observed, the prob-
lem becomes much more complex: this case is examined in Section 6. Finally,
Section 7 identifies open problems and possible directions of future research.
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1.1 Notation
We shall write I{X} for the indicator function that equals 1 when X is true and
0 otherwise. We consider actions a ∈ A and contexts (states, environments or
outcomes) µ ∈M . We shall denote a sequence of observations from some set X
as xt , x1, . . . ,xt , with xk ∈X .
In general, P(X) will denote the probability of any event X selected from na-
ture and E to denote expectations. When observations, outcomes or events are
generated via some specific process µ , we shall explicitly denote this by writing
P(·|µ) for the probability of events. Frequently, we shall use the shorthand µ(·) to
denote probabilities (or densities, when there is no ambiguity) under the process
µ . With this scheme, we make no distinction between the name of the process and
the distribution it induces. Thus, the notation µ(·) may imply a marginalisation.
For instance, if a process µ defines a probability density µ(x,y) over observations
x ∈X , y ∈ Y , we shall write µ(x) for the marginal ∫Y µ(x,y)dy. Finally, expec-
tations under the process will be written as Eµ (·) or equivalently E(·|µ). In some
cases it will be convenient to employ equality relations of the type µ(xt = x), to
denote the density at x at time t under process µ .
2 Decision making under uncertainty
Imagine an agent acting within some environment and let us suppose that it has
decided upon a fixed plan of action. Predicting the result of any given action
within the plan, or the result of the complete plan, may not very easy, since there
can be many different sources of uncertainty. Thus, it might be hard to evaluate
actions and plans and consequently, to find the optimal action or plan. This section
will focus in the case where only a single decision must be made.
The simplest type of uncertainty arises when events that take place within the
world can be stochastic. Those may be (apparently) truly random events, such
as which slit will a photon will pass through in the famous two-slit experiment,
or events that can be considered random for all practical purposes, such as the
outcome of a die roll. A possible decision problem in that setting would be whether
to accept or decline a particular bet on the outcome of one die roll: if the odds are
favorable, we should accept, otherwise decline.
The second source of uncertainty arises when we do not know exactly how the
world works. Consider the problem of predicting the movement of planets given
their current positions and velocities. Modelling their orbits as circular, will of
course result in different predictions to modelling their orbits as elliptic. In this
problem the decision taken involves the selection of the appropriate model.
Estimating which model, or set of models, best corresponds to our observa-
tions of the world becomes harder when there is, in addition, some observation
stochasticity. In the given example, that would mean that we would not be able to
directly observe the planets’ positions and thus it would be harder to determine the
best model.
The model selection problems that we shall examine in this section involve
two separate, well-defined, phases. The first phase involves collecting data, and
the second phase involves making a decision about which is the best model. Many
statistical inference problems are of this type, such as creating a classifier from
categorical data. The usual case is that the observations have already been collected
and now form a fixed dataset. We then define a set of classification models and
the decision making task is to choose one or more classifiers from the given set
of models. A lot of recent work on classification algorithms is in fact derived
from this type of decision making framework Blumer et al. [1989]; Vapnik [2000];
Vapnik. and Chervonenkis [1971]. A straightforward extension of the problem
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to online decision making resulted in the boosting algorithm Freund and Schapire
[1997]. The remainder of this section discusses making single decisions under
uncertainty in more detail.
2.1 Utility, randomness and uncertainty
When agents (and arguably, humans Savage [1972]) make decisions, they do so
on the basis of some preference order among possible outcomes. With perfect
information, the rational choice is easy to determine, since the probability of any
given outcome given the agent’s decision is known. This is a common situation
in games of chance. However, in the face of uncertainty, establishing a preference
order among actions is no longer trivial.
In order to formalize the problem, we allow the agent to select some action
a from a set of A of possible choices. We furthermore define a set of contexts,
states, or environments M , such that the preferred action may differ depending
which is the current context µ ∈M . If the context is perfectly known, then we can
simply take the most preferred action in that context.
One way to model this preference is to define a utility function U : A ×M →R
mapping from the set of possible µ and a to the real numbers.
Definition 2.1 (Utility) For any context µ ∈M , and actions a1,a2 ∈A , we shall
say that we prefer a1 to a2 and write a1 ≻ a2, if and only if U(a1,µ) > U(a2,µ).
Similarly, we write that a1 = a2 iff U(a1,µ) = U(a2,µ).
The transitivity and completeness axioms of utility theory are satisfied by the above
definition, since the utility function’s range are the real numbers. Thus, if both U
and µ are known, then the optimal action must exist and is by definition the one
that maximizes the utility for the given context µ .
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
U(a,µ).
We can usually assign a subjective preference for each action a in all µ , thus mak-
ing the function U well-defined. It possible, however, that we have some uncer-
tainty about µ . We are then obliged to use other formalisms for assigning prefer-
ences to actions.
2.2 Uncertain outcomes
We now consider the case where µ is uncertain. This can occur when µ is chosen
randomly from some known distribution with density p, as is common in lotteries
and random experiments. It may be also chosen by some adversary, which is usual
in deterministic games such as chess. In games of chance, such as backgammon, it
is some combination of the two. Finally, µ could be neither randomly nor selected
by some adversary, but in fact, simply not precisely known: we may only know a
set M which contains µ .
Perhaps the simplest way to assign preferences in the latter case is to select the
action with the highest worst-case utility:
Definition 2.2 (Maximin utility) Our preference V (a) for action a is:
V (a) , inf
µ∈M
U(a,µ). (2.1)
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This is mostly a useful ordering for the adversarial setting. In the stochastic setting,
its main disadvantage is that we may avoid actions which have the highest utility
for most high-probability outcomes, apart for some outcomes with near-zero prob-
ability, whose utility is small. A natural way to take the probability of outcomes
into account, is to use the notion of expected utility:
Definition 2.3 (Expected utility) Our preference V (a) for action a is the expecta-
tion of the utility under the given distribution with density p of possible outcomes:
V (a) , E(U |a) =
∫
M
U(a,µ)p(µ)dµ . (2.2)
This is a good method for the case when the distribution from which µ will be
chosen is known. Another possible method, which can be viewed as a compromise
between expected and maximin utility is to assign preferences to actions based on
how likely they are to be close to the best action. For example, we can take the
action which has the highest probability of being ε-close to the best possible action,
with ε > 0:
Definition 2.4 (Risk-sensitive utility)
V (a;ε) ,
∫
M
I
{
U(a,µ)≥U(a′,µ)− ε, ∀a′ ∈A } p(µ)dµ . (2.3)
Thus, an action chosen with the above criterion is guaranteed to be ε-close to the
actually best action, with probability V (a;ε). This criterion could be alternatively
formulated as the probability that the action’s utility is greater than a fixed thresh-
old θ , rather than being ε-close to the utility of the optimal action. A further
modification involves fixing a small probability δ > 0 and then solving for ε , or θ
to choose the action which has the lowest regret ε , or the highest guaranteed utility
θ , with probability 1−δ . Further discussion of such issues, including some of the
above preference relations is given in Friedman and Savage [1948, 1952]; Luce
and Raiffa [1957]; Savage [1972].
The above definitions are not strictly confined to the case where µ is random. In
Bayesian, or subjectivist viewpoint of probability, we may also assign probabilities
to events which are not random. Those probabilities do not represent possible
random outcomes, but subjective beliefs. It thus becomes possible to extend the
above definitions from uncertainty about random outcomes to uncertainty about
the environment.
2.3 Bayesian inference
Consider now that we are acting in one of many possible environments. With
knowledge of the true environment and the utility function, it would be trivial, in
some sense, to select the utility-maximizing action. However, suppose that we
do not know which of the many possible environments we are acting in. One
possibility is to use the maximin utility rule, but this is usually too pessimistic. An
arguably better alternative is to assign a subjective probability to each environment,
which will represent our belief that it corresponds to reality.1 It then is possible to
use expected utility to select actions.
This is not the main advantage of using subjective probabilities, however. It
is rather the fact that we can then use standard probabilistic inference methods to
update our belief as we acquire more information about the environment. With
1This is mathematically equivalent to the case where the environment was drawn randomly from a
known distribution.
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enough data, we can be virtually certain about which is the true environment, and
thus confidently take the most advantageous action. When the data is few, a lot
of models have a relatively high probability and this uncertainty is reflected in the
decision making.
More formally, we define a set of models M and a prior density ξ0 defined
over its elements µ ∈ M . The prior ξ0(µ) describes our initial belief that the
particular model µ is correct. Sometimes it is unclear how to best choose the prior.
The easiest case to handle is when it is known that the environment was randomly
selected from a probability distribution over M with some density ψ: it is then
natural (and optimal) to simply set ξ0 = ψ . Another possibility is to use experts to
provide information: then the prior can be obtained via formal procedures of prior
elicitation Chen et al. [1999]; Dey et al. [1998]. However, when this is not possible
either due to the lack of experts or due to the fact that the number of parameters
to be chosen is very large, then the priors can be chosen intuitively, according to
computational and convenience considerations, or with some automatic procedure:
a thorough overview of these topics is given by Berger [2006]; Goldstein [2006].
For now we shall assume that we have somehow chosen a prior ξ0.
The procedure for calculating the belief ξt at time t is relatively simple: Let xt
denote our observations at time t. For each model µ in our set, we can calculate
the posterior probability ξt+1(µ) from their prior ξt(µ). This can be done via the
definition of joint densities, which is in this form known as Bayes’ rule:
ξt+1(µ) , ξt(µ |xt) = µ(xt)ξt(µ)∫
M µ ′(xt)ξt(µ ′)dµ ′ , (2.4)
where we have used the fact that ξt(xt |µ) = µ(xt), since the distribution of obser-
vations for a specific model µ is independent of our subjective belief about which
models are most likely.
The advantage of using a Bayesian approach to decision making under uncer-
tainty is that our knowledge about the true environment µ at time t is captured
via the density ξt(µ), which represents our belief. Thus, we are able to easily uti-
lize any of the action preferences outlined in the previous section by replacing the
density p with ξt .
As an example, consider the case where we have obtained t observations and
must choose the action that appears best. After t observations, we will have
reached a belief ξt(µ) and our subjective value for each action is simply:
Vt(a) , E(U |a,ξt) =
∫
M
U(a,µ)ξt(µ)dµ . (2.5)
At this point, perhaps some motivation is needed to see why this is a good idea.
Let µ∗ be the true model, i.e. in fact E(U |a) = U(a,µ∗) and assume that µ∗ ∈M .
Then, under relatively lax assumptions2, it can be shown (c.f. Savage [1972]) that
limt→∞ ξt(µ) = δ (µ −µ∗), where δ is the Dirac delta function. This implies that
the probability measure that represents our belief concentrates3 around µ∗.
There are, of course, a number of problems with this formulation. The first is
that we may be unwilling or unable to specify a prior. The second is that the result-
ing model may be too complicated for practical computations. Finally, although it
is relatively straightforward to compute the expected utility, risk-sensitive compu-
tations are hard in continuous spaces, since they require calculating the integral of
a maximum. In any such situation, distribution-free bounds may be used instead.
2If the true model is not in the set of models, then we may in fact diverge.
3To prove that in more general terms is considerably more difficult, but has been done recently by
Zhang Zhang [2006].
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2.4 Distribution-free bounds
When we have very little information about the distribution, and we do not wish
to utilize “uninformative” or “objective” priors Berger [2006], we can still express
the amount of knowledge acquired through observation by the judicious use of
distribution-free concentration inequalities. The main idea is that, while we cannot
accurately express the possible forms of the underlying distribution, we can always
imagine a worst possible case.
Perhaps the most famous such inequality is Markov’s inequality, which holds
for any random variable X and all ε > 0:
P(|X | ≥ ε)≤ E(|X |)
ε
. (2.6)
Such inequalities are of greatest use when applied to estimates of unknown pa-
rameters. Since our estimates are functions of our observations, which are random
variables, the estimates themselves are also random variables. Perhaps the best
way to see this is through the example of the following inequality, which applies
whenever we wish to estimate the expected value of a bounded random variable by
averaging n observations:
Lemma 2.1 (Hoeffding inequality) If xˆn , 1n ∑ni=1 xi, with xi ∈ [bi,bi +hi] drawn
from some arbitrary distribution fi and x¯n , 1n ∑i E(xi), then, for all ε ≥ 0:
P(|xˆn− x¯n| ≥ ε)≤ 2exp
(
− 2n
2ε2
∑ni=1 h2i
)
. (2.7)
The above inequality is simply interpreted as telling us that the probability of us
making a large estimation error decreases exponentially in the number of samples.
Unlike the Bayesian viewpoint, where the mean was a random variable, we now
consider the mean to be a fixed unknown quantity, and our estimate to be the
random variable. So, in practice, such inequalities are useful for obtaining bounds
on the performance of algorithms and estimates, rather than expressing uncertainty
per se.
More generally, such inequalities operate on sets. For any model set M of
interest, we should be able to obtain an appropriate concentration function δ (M,n)
on subsets M ⊂M , with n ∈ N being the number of observations, such that:
P(µ /∈M) < δ (M,n), (2.8)
where one normally considers µ to be a fixed unknown quantity and M to be a
random estimated quantity. As an example, the right hand side of the Hoeffding
inequality can be seen as a specific instance of a concentration function, where
M = {x : |xˆn−x|< ε}. A detailed introduction to concentration functions in much
more general terms is given by Talagrand [Talagrand, 1996].
An immediate use of such inequalities is to calculate high probability bounds
on the utility of actions. Firstly, given the deterministic payoff function U(a,µ),
and a suitable δ (M,n), let:
θ(M,a) , inf
µ∈M
U(a,µ), (2.9)
be a lower bound on the payoff of action a in set M. It immediately follows that
the payoff U(a) we shall obtain for taking action a will satisfy:
P[U(a,µ) < θ(M,a)]≤ δ (M,n),
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since the probability of our estimated set not containing µ is bounded by δ (M,n).
Thus, one may fix a set M and then select a maximizing θ(a,M). This will give a
guaranteed performance with probability at least 1−δ (M,n).
Such inequalities are also useful to bound the expected regret. Let the regret of
a procedure that has payoff U relative to some other procedure with payoff U∗ be
U∗−U . Now consider that we want take an action a that minimizes the expected
regret relative to some maximum value U∗, which can be written as:
E(U∗−U |a) = E(U∗−U |a,µ ∈M)P(µ ∈M)+E(U∗−U |a,µ /∈M)P(µ /∈M),
(2.10)
where the first term of the sum corresponds to the expected regret that we incur
when the model is in the set M, while the right term corresponds to the case when
the model is not within M. Each of these terms can be bounded with (2.8) and
(2.9): the first term is bounded by E(U∗−U |a,µ ∈M) < U∗−θ(M,a) and P(µ ∈
M) < 1, while the second term is bounded by E(U∗−U |a,µ /∈M) < U∗− inf(U)
and P(µ /∈ M) < δ (M,n). Assuming that the infimum exists, the expected regret
for any action a ∈A is bounded by:
E(U∗−U |a)≤ (U∗−θ(M,a))+(U∗− inf(U))δ (M,n). (2.11)
Thus, such methods are useful for taking an action which minimizes a bound on
the expected regret, that maximizes the probability its utility is greater than some
threshold, or finally that maximizes a lower bound on the utility with some at least
some probability. However, they cannot be used to select actions that maximize
expected utility, simply because the expectation cannot be calculated as we do not
have an explicit probability density function over the possible models. We discuss
two upper confidence bound based methods for bandit problems in section 3.2 and
for the reinforcement learning problem in section 5.5.
3 Sequential decision making under uncertainty
The previous section examined two complementary frameworks for decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. The task was relatively straightforward, as it involved a
fixed period of data collection, followed by a single decision. This is far from an
uncommon situation in practice, since a lot of real-world decisions are made in
such a way.
In a lot of cases, however, decisions may involve future collection of data. For
example, during medical trials, data is continuously collected and assessed. The
trial may have to be stopped early if the risk to the patients is deemed too great. A
lot of such problems were originally considered in the seminal work of Wald Wald
[1947].
This section will present a brief overview of the three main types of sequential
decision making problems: Stopping problems, which are the simplest type, ban-
dit problems, which can be viewed as a generalization of stopping problems, and
reinforcement learning, which is a general enough framework to encompass most
problems in sequential decision making. The reader should also be aware of the
links of sequential decision making to classification Freund and Schapire [1997],
optimization Auer et al. [2007]; Coquelin and Munos [2007]; Kall and Wallace
[1994] and control Agrawal [1995]; Bertsekas [2005, 2001].
3.1 Stopping problems
Let us imagine an experimenter, who needs to make a decision a ∈A , where A is
the set of possible decisions. The effect of each different decision will depend on
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both a and the actual situation in which the decision is taken. However, although
the experimenter can quantify the consequences of his decisions for each possible
situation, he is not sure what the situation actually is. So, he first must spend
some time to collect information about the situation before committing himself to
a specific decision. The only difficulty is that the information is not free. Thus, the
experimenter must decide at which point he must stop collecting data and finally
make a decision.
Such optimal stopping problems arise in many settings: Clinical trials Cher-
noff [1966], optimization Boender and Rinnooy Kan [1987], detecting changes in
distributions Moustakides [1986], active learning Dimitrakakis and Savu-Krohn
[2008]; Roy and McCallum [2001], as well as the the problem of deciding when
to halt an optimization procedure Boender and Rinnooy Kan [1987]. A general
introduction to such problems can be found in DeGroot [1970].
As before, we assume the existence of a utility function U(a,µ) defined for all
µ ∈M , where M is the set of all possible universes of interest. The experimenter
knows the utility function, but is not sure which universe the experiment is taking
place in. This uncertainty about which µ ∈M is true is expressed via a subjective
distribution ξt(µ) , P(µ |ξt), where ξt represents the belief at time t.
The expected utility of immediately taking an action at time t can then be writ-
ten as V0(ξt) = maxa ∑µ U(a,µ)ξt(µ), i.e. the experimenter takes the action which
seems best on average. Now, consider that instead of making an immediate deci-
sion, he has the opportunity to take k more observations Dk = (d1, . . . ,dk) from a
sample space Sk, at a cost c > 0 per observation4, thus allowing him to update his
belief to
ξt+k(µ |ξt) , ξt(µ |Dk).
What the experimenter must do in order to choose between immediately making a
decision a and continuing sampling, is to compare the utility of making a decision
now with the cost of making k observations plus the utility of making a decision
after k time-steps, when the extra data would enable a more informed choice.
The problem is in fact a dynamic programming problem. The utility of making
an immediate decision is
V0(ξt) = max
a
∫
M
U(a,µ)ξt(µ)dµ (3.1)
Similarly, we denote the utility of an immediate decision at any time t + T by
V0(ξt+T ). The utility of taking at most k samples before making a decision can be
written recursively as:
Vk+1(ξt) = max{V0(ξt),E[Vk(ξt+1)|ξt ]− c}, (3.2)
where the expectation with respect to ξt is in fact taken over all possible observa-
tions under belief ξt :
E[Vk(ξt+1)|ξt ] = ∑
dt+1∈S
Vk(ξt+1(µ |dt+1))ξt(dt+1), (3.3)
ξt(dt+1) =
∫
M
µ(dt+1)ξt(µ)dµ , (3.4)
where ξt(µ |dt+1) indicates the specific next belief ξt+1 arising from the previous
belief ξt and the observations dt+1.
This indicates that we can perform a backwards induction procedure, starting
from all possible terminal belief states ξt+T to calculate the value of stopping im-
mediately. We would only be able to insert the payoff function U directly when
4The case of non-constant cost is not significantly different.
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we calculate V0. Taking T → ∞ gives us the exact solution. In other words, one
should stop and make an immediate decision if the following holds for all k > 0:
V0(ξt)≥Vk(ξt). (3.5)
Note that if the payoff function is bounded we can stop the procedure at T ∝ c−1.
A number of bounds may be useful for stopping problems. For instance, the
expected value of perfect information to an experimenter, can be used as a surro-
gate to the complete problem, and was examined by McCall McCall [1965]. Con-
versely, lower bounds on the expected sample size and the regret were examined
by Hoeffding Hoeffding [1960]. Stopping problems also appear in the context of
bandit problems, or more generally, reinforcement learning. For instance the prob-
lem of finding a nearly optimal plan with high probability can be converted to a
stopping problem Even-Dar et al. [2006].
3.2 Bandit problems
We now consider a generalization of the stopping problem. Imagine that our ex-
perimenter visits a casino and is faced with n different bandit machines. Playing a
machine at time t results in a random payoff rt ∈ R⊂R. The average payoff of the
i-th machine is µi. Thus, at time t the experimenter selects a machine with index
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} to receive a random payoff with expected value E(rt |at = i) = µi,
which is fixed but unknown. The experimenter’s goal is to leave the casino with as
much money as possible. This can be formalized as maximizing the expected sum
of discounted future payoffs to time T :
E
(
T
∑
t=1
γkrt
)
, (3.6)
where γ ∈ [0,1] is a discount factor that reduces the importance of payoffs far in the
future as it approaches 0. The horizon T may be finite or infinite, fixed, drawn from
a known distribution, or simply unknown. It is also possible that the experimenter
is allowed to stop at any time, thus adding stopping to the set of possible decisions
and making the problem a straightforward generalization of the stopping problem.
If the average payoffs are known, then the optimal solution is obviously to always
take action a∗ = argmaxi µi, no matter what γ and T are and is thus completely
uninteresting.
This problem was typically studied in a Bayesian setting Chernoff [1966]; Git-
tins [1989], where computable optimal solutions have been found for some special
cases Gittins [1989]. However, recently there have been algorithms that achieve
optimal regret rates in a distribution-free setting. In particular, the UCB1 algorithm
by Auer et al Auer et al. [2002] selects the arm with highest empirical mean plus
an upper confidence bound, with an error probability schedule tuned to achieve
low regret. More specifically, let the empirical mean of the i-th arm at time t be:
ˆE[rt |at = i] , 1
nti
t
∑
k:ak=i
rt , n
t
i ,
t
∑
k=1
I{ak = i} , (3.7)
where nti is the number of times arm i has been played until time t. After playing
each arm once, the algorithm always selects the arm maximizing:
ˆE[rt |at = i]+
√
2log t
nti
. (3.8)
This guarantees a regret that only scales with rate O(logT ).
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The setting has been generalized to continuous time Chernoff [1966], non-
stationary or adversarial bandits Auer [2002], continuous spacesAgrawal [1995];
Auer et al. [2007] and to trees Coquelin and Munos [2007]; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri
[2006], while a collection of related results can be found in [Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi, 2006]. Finally, the bandit payoffs can also depend on a context variable.
If this variable cannot be affected by the experimenter, then it is sufficient to learn
the mean payoffs for all contexts in order to be optimal. However, the problem
becomes much more interesting when the experimenter’s actions also influence
the context of the game. This directly leads us to the concept of problems with
state.
3.3 Reinforcement learning and control
We now generalize further to problems where the payoffs depend not only on the
individual actions that we perform, but also on a context, or state. This is a common
situation in games. A good example is blackjack, where drawing or stopping (the
two possible actions in a game) have expected payoffs that depend on your current
hand (the current state, assuming the croupier’s hand is random and independent
of your own hand).
Both reinforcement learning and control problems are formally identical. Nev-
ertheless, historically, classical control (c.f.Stengel [1994]) addressed the case where
the objective is a known functional of the state s and action a. Reinforcement
learning, on the other hand, started from the assumption that the objective function
itself is unknown (though its functional form is known) and must be estimated.
Both discrete-time control and reinforcement learning problems can be formalized
in the framework of Markov decision processes.
4 Markov decision processes
Definition 4.1 (Markov decision process) A Markov decision process (MDP) is
defined as the tuple µ = (S ,A ,T ,R) comprised of a set of states S , a set of
actions A , a transition distribution T conditioning the next state on the current
state and action,
T (s′|s,a) , µ(st+1=s′|st=s,at = a) (4.1)
satisfying the Markov property µ(st+1 | st ,at) = µ(st+1 | st ,at ,st−1,at−1, . . .), and
a reward distribution R conditioned on states and actions:
R(r|s,a) , µ(rt+1=r | st=s,at=a), (4.2)
with a ∈A , s,s′ ∈S , r ∈ R. Finally,
µ(rt+1,st+1|st ,at) = µ(rt+1|st ,at)µ(st+1|st ,at). (4.3)
We shall denote the set of all MDPs as M . We are interested in sequential decision
problems where, at each time step t, the agent seeks to maximize the expected
utility
T−t
∑
k=1
γk E[rt+k | ·],
where r is a stochastic reward and ut is simply the discounted sum of future re-
wards. We shall assume that the sequence of rewards arises from a Markov deci-
sion process.
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In order to describe how we select actions, we define a policy pi as a distribution
on actions conditioned on the current state pi(at |st). If we are interested in the
rewards to some horizon T , then we can define a T -horizon value function for an
MDP µ ∈M at time t as:
V piµ,t,T (s) ,
T−t
∑
k=1
γk E[rt+k | st = s,pi,µ ], (4.4)
the expected sum of future rewards given that we are at state s at time t and select-
ing actions according to policy pi in the MDP µ . Superscripts and subscripts of V
may be dropped when they are clear from context.
The value function of any policy can be calculated recursively by starting from
the terminal states.
V piµ,t,T (s) = E[rt+1 | st=s,pi,µ ]+ γ ∑
s′
µ(st+1=s′ | st=s,at=a)V piµ,t+1,T (s′). (4.5)
The optimal value function, i.e. the value function of the optimal policy pi∗, can be
calculated by a maximizing over actions at each stage:
V pi
∗
µ,t,T (s) = max
a∈A
E[rt+1 | st=s,at=a,µ ]+ γ ∑
s′
µ(st+1=s′ | st=s,at=a)V pi
∗
µ,t+1,T (s
′).
(4.6)
The recursive form of this equation is frequently referred to as the Bellman re-
cursion and allows us to compute the value of a predecessor state from that of
a following state. The resulting algorithm is called backwards induction or value
iteration. When the number of states is finite, the same recursion allows us to com-
pute the value of states when the horizon is infinite, as then, limT→∞ V piµ,t,T = V piµ
for all finite t. Finally note that frequently we shall denote V pi∗µ,t,T simply by V ∗
when the environmental variables are clear from context.
5 Belief-augmented Markov decision processes
When the MDP is unknown, we need to explicitly take into account our uncer-
tainty. In control theory, this is referred to as the problem of dual control [Stengel,
1994, Sec. 5.2]. This involves selecting actions (control inputs) such as to improve
parameter (and state) estimation in order to hopefully reduce future costs. This
behavior is called probing. At the same time, the control strategy must not neglect
the minimization of the cost at the current time.
This type of dilemma in its simplest forms occurs in the already discussed
bandit problems, where we must strike an optimal balance between exploring al-
ternative bandits and exploiting the apparently best bandit. Any optimal solution
must take into account the uncertainty that we have about the environment.
A natural idea is to use a Bayesian framework (c.f. Duff [2002]) to represent
our beliefs. As summarized in section 2.3, this involves maintaining a belief ξt ∈Ξ,
about which MDP µ ∈M corresponds to reality. In a Bayesian setting, ξt(µ) is a
subjective probability density over MDPs.
5.1 Bayesian inference with a single MDP model class
We shall cover the case where it is known that the true MDP µ∗ is in some set of
MDPs M . For example, it may be known that the MDP has at most K discrete
states and that the rewards at each state are Bernoulli, but we know neither the ac-
tual transition probabilities nor the reward distributions. Nevertheless, we can use
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closed form Bayesian techniques to model our belief about which model is correct:
For discrete state spaces, transitions can be expressed as multinomial distributions,
to which the Dirichlet density is a conjugate prior. Similarly, unknown Bernoulli
distributions can be modelled via a Beta prior. If we assume that the densities
are not dependent, then the prior over all densities is a product of Dirichlet priors,
and similarly for rewards. Then we only need a number of parameters of order
O(|S |2|A |). The remainder of this section discusses this in more detail.
Let M be the set of MDPs with unknown transition probabilities and state
space S of size K. We denote our belief at time t +1 about which MDP is true as
simply our belief density at time t conditioned on the latest observations:
ξt+1(µ) , ξt(µ |rt+1,st+1,stat) (5.1a)
=
µ(rt+1,st+1|st ,at)ξt(µ)∫
M µ ′(rt+1,st+1|st ,at)ξt(µ ′)dµ ′ . (5.1b)
We consider the case where M is an infinite set of MDPs, where each MDP µ ∈M
corresponds to a particular joint probability distribution over the state-action pairs.
We shall begin by defining a belief for the transition of each state action pair
s,a separately. Firstly, we denote by τs,a ∈ [0,1]K the parameters of the multino-
mial distribution over the K possible next states, from a specific starting state s and
action a. Our belief will be a Dirichlet distribution – a function of x ∈ RK with
‖x‖1 = 1 and x ∈ [0,1]K , with parameters ψs,a ∈ NK . If we denote the parame-
ters of our belief ξt at time t by ψs,a(t), then the Dirichlet density over possible
multinomial distributions can be written as:
ξt(τs,a = x) = Γ(ψ
s,a(t))
∏i∈S Γ(ψs,ai (t)) ∏i∈S x
ψs,ai (t)
i , (5.2)
where ψs,ai denotes the i-th component of ψs,a. The set of parameters ψ can be
written in matrix form as Ψ(t) to denote the |S ||A |× |S | matrix of state-action-
state transition counts at time t. The initial parameters Ψ(0) form a matrix that
defines tne parameters of our set prior Dirichlets distributions.
Thus, for any belief ξt , the Dirichlet parameters are {ψ j,ai (t) : i, j ∈S ,a∈A }.
These values are initialised to Ψ(0) and are updated via simple counting:
ψ j,ai (t +1) = ψ
j,a
i (t)+ I{st+1 = i∧ st = j∧at = a} , (5.3)
meaning that every time we observe a specific transition st ,at ,st+1, we increment
the corresponding Dirichlet parameter by one.
We now need to move from the distribution of a single state-action pair to the
set of transition distributions for the whole MDP. In order to do this easily, we shall
make the following simplifying assumption:
Assumption 5.1 For any s,s′ ∈S and a,a′ ∈A ,
ξ (τs,a,τs′,a′) = ξ (τs,a)ξ (τs′,a′). (5.4)
This assumption significantly simplifies the model but does not let us take into
advantage of the case where there may be some dependencies in the transition
probabilities. Now we shall denote the matrix of state-action-state transition prob-
abilities for a specific MDP µ as T µ . Analogously to τs,a, we denote, for the
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specific MDP µ , the next state distribution multinomial parameter vector from
pair (s,a) to be τµs,a, with τµs,a(i) , µ(st+1 = i | st=s,at=a). Then we obtain:
ξt(µ) = ξt(T µ ) = ξt(τs,a = τµs,a∀s ∈S ,a ∈A ) (5.5a)
= ∏
s∈S
∏
a∈A
ξt(τs,a = τµs,a), (5.5b)
= ∏
s∈S
∏
a∈A
Γ(ψs,a(t))
∏i∈S Γ(ψs,ai (t)) ∏i∈S
(
τµs,a,i
)ψs,ai (t)
, (5.5c)
where we used Assumption 5.1. This means that the transition counts Ψ are a
sufficient statistic for expressing the density over M .
We can additionally model µ(rt+1|st ,at) with a suitable belief (for example a
Beta, Normal-Gamma or Pareto prior) and assume independence. This in no way
complicates the exposition for MDPs.
5.2 Constructing and solving BAMDPs
In order to optimally select actions in this framework, we need to consider how
our actions will affect our future beliefs. The corresponding Bayesian procedure
is not substantially different from the optimal stopping procedure outlined in 3.1.
The approach outlined in this section was suggested originally in Bellman and
Kalaba [1959] under the name of Adaptive Control Processes and was investigated
more fully in Duff and Barto [1997]; Duff [2002]. It involves the creation of an
augmented MDP, with a state comprised of the original MDP’s state st and our
belief state ξt . We can then solve the problem in principle via standard dynamic
programming algorithms such as backwards induction, similarly to section 3.1. We
shall call such models BAMDPs (Belief-Augmented MDPs).
In BAMDPs, we are at some combined belief and environment state ωt =
(ξt ,st) at each point in time t, which we call the hyper-state . For every possible
action at , we may observe any st+1 ∈ S and any possible reward rt+1 ∈ R ⊂ R,
which would lead to a unique new belief ξt+1 and thus a unique new hyper-state
ωt+1 = (ξt+1,st+1).
More formally, we may give the following definition:
Definition 5.1 (Belief-Augmented MDP) A Belief-Augmented MDP ν (BAMDP)
is an MDP ν = (Ω,A ,T ′,R′) where Ω = S ×Ξ, where Ξ is an appropriate set
of probability measures on M , and T ′,R′ are the transition and reward distribu-
tions conditioned jointly on the MDP state st , the belief state ξt , and the action at .
Here the density p(ξt+1|ξt ,rt+1,st+1,st ,at) is singular, since ξt+1 is a determinis-
tic function of ξt ,rt+1,st+1,st ,at . Thus, we can define the transition
ν(ωt+1|at ,ωt), (5.6)
where ωt , (st ,ξt).
It should be obvious that st ,ξt jointly form a Markov state in this setting, called
the hyper-state. In general, we shall denote the components of a future hyper-state
ω it as (s
i
t ,ξ it ). However, in occasion we will abuse notation by referring to the
components of some hyper-state ω as sω ,ξω . We shall use MB to denote the set
of BAMDPs.
As in the MDP case, finite horizon problems only require looking at all fu-
ture hyper-states until the horizon T , where we omit the subscript ν for the value
function:
V ∗t,T (ωt) = max
at
E[rt+1|ωt ,at ,ν ]+ γ
∫
Ω
V ∗t+1,T (ωt+1)ν(ωt+1|ωt ,at)dωt+1. (5.7)
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It is easy to see that the size of the set of hyper-states in general grows exponen-
tially with the horizon. Thus, we can not perform value iteration with bounded
memory, as we did for discrete MDPs. One possibility is to continue expanding
the belief tree until we are certain of the optimality of an action. As has previously
been observed Dearden et al. [1998]; Dimitrakakis [2006], this is possible since
we can always obtain upper and lower bounds on the utility of any policy from the
current hyper-state. In addition, we can apply such bounds on future hyper-states
in order to efficiently expand the tree.
5.3 Belief tree expansion
Let the current belief be ξt and suppose we observe xit , (sit+1,rit+1,ait). This
observation defines a unique subsequent belief ξ it+1. Together with the MDP state
s, this creates a hyper-state transition from ωt to ω it+1.
By recursively obtaining observations for future beliefs, we can obtain an un-
balanced tree with nodes {ω it+k : k = 1, . . . ,T ; i = 1, . . .}. However, we cannot
hope to be able to fully expand the tree. This is especially true in the case where
observations (i.e. states, rewards, or actions) are continuous, where we cannot per-
form even a full single-step expansion. Even in the discrete case the problem is
intractable for infinite horizons – and far too complex computationally for the fi-
nite horizon case. However, had there been efficient tree expansion methods, this
problem would be largely alleviated.
All tree search methods require the expansion of leaf nodes. However, in gen-
eral, a leaf node may have an infinite number of children. We thus need some
strategies to limit the number of children. More formally, let us assume that we
wish to expand in node ω it = (ξ it ,sit), with ξ it defining a density over M . For
discrete state/action/reward spaces, we can simply enumerate all the possible out-
comes {ω jt+1}
|S×A×R|
j=1 , where R is the set of possible reward outcomes. Note that
if the reward is deterministic, there is only one possible outcome per state-action
pair. The same holds if T is deterministic, in both cases making an enumeration
possible. While in general this may not be the case, since rewards, states, or actions
can be continuous, in this chapter we shall only examine the discrete case.
5.4 Bounds on the optimal value function
Let ΩT be the set of leaf nodes of the partially expanded belief tree and ν the
BAMDP process. If the values of the leaf nodes were known, then we could easily
perform the backwards induction procedure, shown in Algorithm 1 for BAMDPs:
If one thinks of the BAMDP as a very large MDP, one can see that the algorithm
(also called value iteration) is identical to equation (4.6), with the subtle difference
that the reward only depends on the next hyper-state.
The main problem is obtaining a good estimate for V ∗T , i.e. the value of leaf
nodes. Let pi∗(µ) denote the policy such that, for any pi ,
V pi
∗(µ)
µ (s)≥V piµ (s), ∀s ∈S .
Furthermore, let the mean MDP arising from the belief ξ at hyper-state ω = (s,ξ )
be µ¯ξ , E[µ |ξ ].
Proposition 5.1 The optimal value function V ∗ of the BAMPD ν at any hyper-
state ω = (s,ξ ) is bounded by the following inequalities∫
V pi
∗(µ)
µ (s)ξ (µ)dµ ≥V ∗(ω)≥
∫
V pi
∗(µ¯ξ )
µ (s)ξ (µ)dµ. (5.8)
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Algorithm 1 Backwards induction action selection
1: input Process ν , time t, leaf nodes ΩT , leaf node values V ∗T .
2: for n = T −1,T −2, . . . , t do
3: for ω ∈Ωn do
4:
a∗n(ω) = argmax
a
∑
ω ′∈Ωn+1
ν(ω ′|ω,a)[E(r|ω ′,ω,ν)+V ∗n+1(ω ′)]
V ∗n (ω) = ∑
ω ′∈Ωn+1
ν(ω ′|ω,a∗)[E(r|ω ′,ω,ν)+V ∗n+1(ω ′)]
5: end for
6: end for
7: return a∗t
The proof is given in the appendix. In POMDPs, a trivial lower bound can be
obtained by calculating the value of the blind policy Hauskrecht [2000]; Smith
and Simmons [2005], which always takes the a fixed action, i.e. at = a for all t.
Our lower bound is in fact the BAMDP analogue of the value of the blind policy in
POMDPs if we consider BAMDP policies are POMDP actions. The analogy is due
to the fact that for any policy pi , which selects actions by considering only the MDP
state, i.e. such that pi(at |st ,ξt) = pi(at |st), it holds trivially that V pi (ω) ≤ V ∗(ω),
in the same way that it holds trivially if we consider only the set of policies which
always take the same action. In fact, of course V ∗(ω) ≥ V pi (ω) for any pi , by
definition. In our case, we have made this lower bound tighter by considering
pi∗(µ¯ξ ), the policy that is greedy with respect to the current mean estimate.
The upper bound itself is analogous to the POMDP value function bound given
in Theorem 9 of Hauskrecht [2000]. The crucial difference is that, in our case, both
bounds can only be approximated via Monte Carlo sampling with some probability,
unless M is finite.
5.4.1 Leaf node lower bound
A lower bound can be obtained by calculating the expected value of any policy. In
order to have a tighter bound, we can perform value iteration in the mean MDP.
Let us use µ¯ξ to denote the mean MDP for belief ξ , with transition probabilities
Tµ¯ξ a and mean rewards Rµ¯ξ :
Tµ¯ξ , µ¯ξ (st+1|st ,at) = E(T µ |ξt) (5.9)
Rµ¯ξ , µ¯ξ (st+1|st ,at) = E(Rµ |ξt). (5.10)
Similarly, let V piµ¯ξ be the column vector of the value function of the mean MDP, to
obtain:
V piµ¯ξ = Rµ¯ξ + γ
∫
T
pi
µ¯ξ V
pi
µ¯ξ ξ (µ)dµ
= Rµ¯ξ + γ
(∫
T
pi
µ¯ξ ξ (µ)dµ
)
V piµ¯ξ
= Rµ¯ξ + γT piµ¯ξ V
pi
µ¯ξ .
This is now a standard Bellman recursion, which we can use to obtain the policy pi ∗¯µ
which is optimal with respect to the mean MDP. Unfortunately the value function
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Figure 1: Illustration of upper and lower bounds on the value function,
averaged over all states, as more observations are acquired. It can be seen
that the , mean MDP value (crosses) is far from the bounds initially. The
bounds were calculated by taking the empirical mean of 1000 MDP sam-
ples from the current belief.
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of the mean MDP does not generally equal the expected value of the BAMDP:
V piµ¯ξ 6= E[V pi |ξ ].
Nevertheless, the stationary policy that is optimal with respect to the mean MDP
can be used to evaluate the right hand side for pi = pi ∗¯µ , which will hopefully result
in a relatively tight lower bound. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which displays up-
per and lower bounds on the BAMDP value function as observations are acquired
in a simple maze task.
If the beliefs ξ can be expressed in closed form, it is easy to calculate the
mean transition distribution and the mean reward from ξ . For discrete state spaces,
transitions can be expressed as multinomial distributions, to which the Dirichlet
density is a conjugate prior. In that case, for Dirichlet parameters {ψ j,ai (ξ ) : i, j ∈
S ,a ∈A }, we have
µ¯ξ (s′|s,a) =
ψs,as′ (ξ )
∑i∈S ψs,ai (ξ )
(5.11)
Similarly, for Bernoulli rewards, the corresponding mean model arising from the
beta prior with parameters {αs,a(ξ ),β s,a(ξ ) : s ∈ S ,a ∈ A } is E[r|s,a, µ¯ξ ] =
αs,a(ξ )/(αs,a(ξ )+ β s,a(ξ )). Then the value function of the mean model can be
found with standard value iteration.
5.4.2 Bounds with high probability
In general, neither the upper nor the lower bounds cannot be expressed in closed
form. However, the integral can be approximated via Monte Carlo sampling.
Let us be in some hyper-state ω = (s,ξ ). We can obtain c MDP samples from
the belief at ω: µ1, . . . ,µc ∼ ξ (µ). In order to estimate the upper bound, for
each µk we can derive the optimal policy pi∗(µk) and estimate its value function
v˜∗k , V
pi∗(µk)
µk ≡V ∗µk . We may then average these samples to obtain
vˆ∗c(ω) ,
1
c
c
∑
k=1
v˜∗k(s), (5.12)
where s is the state at hyper-state ω . Let v¯∗(ω) =
∫
M ξ (µ)V ∗µ (s)dµ . It holds that
limc→∞[vˆc] = v¯∗(ω) and that E[vˆc] = v¯∗(ω). Due to the latter, we can apply a
Hoeffding inequality
P(|vˆ∗c(ω)− v¯∗(ω)|> ε) < 2exp
(
− 2cε
2
(Vmax−Vmin)2
)
, (5.13)
thus bounding the error within which we estimate the upper bound. For rt ∈ [0,1]
and discount factor γ , note that Vmax−Vmin ≤ 1/(1− γ).
The procedure for the lower bound is identical, but we only need to estimate
the value v˜k , V
pi∗(µ¯ξ )
µk of the mean-MDP-optimal policy pi∗(µ¯ξ ) for each one of
the sampled MDPs µk. Thus we obtain a pair of high probability bounds for any
BAMDP node.
5.5 Discussion and related work
Employing the above bounds together with efficient search methods [Coquelin and
Munos, 2007; Dimitrakakis, 2008, 2009; Hren and Munos, 2008] is a promising
direction. Even when the search is efficient, however, the complexity remains
prohibitive for large problems due to the high branching factor and the dependency
on the horizon.
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Poupart et al Poupart et al. [2006] have proposed an analytic solution to Bayesian
reinforcement learning. They focus on how to efficiently approximate (5.7). More
specifically, they use the fact that the optimal value function is the upper envelope
of a set of linear segments
V ∗t,T (ωt) = max
α∈Γ
α(ωt),
with
α(ωt) =
∫
M
ξt(µ)α(st ,µ)dµ .
They then show that the k + 1-horizon α-function can be computed from the k-
horizon α-function via the following backwards induction:
α(ωt) = ∑
i
µ(st+1=i | st ,a∗(ωt))[E(R | st+1=i,st ,a∗(ωt))+ γα(ω i,a
∗(ω)
t+1 )],
(5.14)
V k+1(ω) = max
a∈Γk+1
α(ω), (5.15)
where ω it+1 denotes the augmented state resulting from starting at ωt , taking action
a∗(ωt) and transiting to the MDP state i. However, the complexity of this process
is still exponential with the planning horizon. For this reason, the authors use a
projection of the α-functions. This is performed on a set of belief points selected
via sampling a default trajectory. The idea is that one may generalize from the
set of sample beliefs to other, similar, belief states. In fact, the approximate value
function they derive is a lower bound on the BAMDP value function. It is an open
question whether or when the bounds presented here are tighter.
At this point, however, it is unclear under what conditions efficient online
methods would outperform approximate analytic methods. Perhaps a combination
of the two methods would be of interest: i.e. using the online search and bounds in
order to see when the point-based approximation has become too inaccurate. The
online search could also be used to sample new belief points.
It should be noted that online methods break down when γ → 1 because the
belief tree can not in general be expanded to the required depth. In fact, the only
currently known methods which are nearly optimal in the undiscounted case are
based on distribution-free bounds Auer et al. [2008]. Similarly to the bandit case,
it is possible to perform nearly optimally in an unknown MDP by considering up-
per confidence bounds on the value function. Auer et al [Auer et al., 2008] in
fact give an algorithm which achieves regret O(D|S |√|A |T ) after T steps for
any unknown MDP with diameter5 D. In exactly the same way as the Bayesian
approach, the algorithm maintains counts Ψ over observe state-action-state tran-
sitions. In order to obtain an optimistic value function, the authors consider an
augmented MDP which is constructed from a set of plausible MDPs M, where M
is such that P(Ψ|µ /∈ M) < δ . Then, instead of augmenting the state space, they
augment the action space by allowing the simultaneous choice of actions a ∈ A
and MDPs µ ∈ M. The policy is then chosen by performing average value itera-
tion [c.f. Puterman, 2005] in the augmented MDP.
There has not been much work yet for Bayesian methods in the undiscounted
case, with the exception of Bernoulli bandit problems Kelly [1981]. It may well
be that in fact naive look-ahead methods are impractical. In order to achieve
O(D|S |√|A |T ) regret with online methods Dimitrakakis [2009] requires an in-
stantaneous regret εt such that ∑Tt εt <
√
T , ⇒ εt < 1/
√
t. If we naively bound our
instantaneous regret by discounting, then that would require our horizon to grow
5Intuitively, the maximin expected time needed to reach any state from any other state, where the max
is taken over state pairs and the min over policies. See [Puterman, 2005] for details.
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with rate O(log1/γ
√
t/(1− γ)), something which seems impractical with current
online search techniques.
6 Partial observability
A useful extension of the MDP model can be obtained by not allowing the agent
to directly observe the state of the environment, but an observation variable ot that
is conditioned on the state. This more realistic assumption is formally defined as
follows:
Definition 6.1 (Partially observable Markov decision process) A partially observ-
able Markov decision process µ (POMDP) is defined as the tuple µ =(S ,A ,O,T ,R)
comprised of a set of observations O , a set of states S , a set of actions A ,
a transition-observation distribution T conditioned the current state and action
µ(st+1 = s′,ot+1 = o|st = s,at = a) and a reward distribution R, conditioned on
the state and action µ(rt+1 = r|st = s,at = a), with a∈A , s,s′ ∈S , o∈O , r ∈R.
We shall denote the set of POMDPs as MP. For POMDPs, it is often assumed that
one of the two following factorizations holds:
µ(st+1,ot+1|st ,at) = µ(st+1|st ,at)µ(ot+1|st+1) (6.1)
µ(st+1,ot+1|st ,at) = µ(st+1|st ,at)µ(ot+1|st ,at). (6.2)
The assumption that the observations are only dependent on a single state or a
single state-action pair is a natural decomposition for a lot of practical problems.
POMDPs are formally identical to BAMDPs. More specifically, BAMDPs cor-
respond to a special case of a POMDP in which the state is split into two parts: One
fully observable dynamic part and one unobservable, continuous, but stationary
part, which models the unknown MDP. Typically, however, in POMDP applica-
tions the unobserved part of a state is dynamic and discrete.
The problem of acting optimally in POMDPs has two aspects. The first is state
estimation, and the second is acting optimally given the estimated state. As far as
the first part is concerned, given an initial state probability distribution, updating
the belief for a discrete state space amounts to simply maintaining a multinomial
distribution over the states. However, the initial state distribution might not be
known. In that case, we may assume an initial prior density over the multinomial
state distribution. It is easy to see that this is simply a special case of an unknown
state transition distribution, where we insert a special initial state which is only
visited once. We shall, however, be concerned with the more general case of full
exploration in POMDPs, where all state transition distributions are unknown.
6.1 Belief POMDPs
It is possible to create an augmented MDP for POMDP models, by endowing them
with an additional belief state, in the same manner as MDPs. However now the
belief state will be a joint probability distribution over MP and S . Nevertheless,
each (at ,ot+1) pair that is observed leads to a unique subsequent belief state. More
formally, a belief-augmented POMDP is defined as follows:
Definition 6.2 (Belief POMDP) A Belief POMDP ν (BAPOMPD) is an MDP
ν = (Ω,A ,O,T ′,R′) where Ω = G ×B, where G is the set of probability mea-
sures on S , B is the set of probability measures on MP, T ′ R′ are the belief
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state transition and reward distributions conditioned on the belief state ξt and the
action at such that the following factorizations are satisfied for all µ ∈MP, ξt ∈B
p(st+1|st ,at ,st−1, . . . ,µ) = µ(st+1|st ,at) (6.3)
p(ot |st ,at ,ot−1, . . . ,µ) = µ(ot |st ,at) (6.4)
p(ξt+1|ot+1,at ,ξt) =
∫
MP
p(ξt+1|µ ,ot+1,at ,ξt)ξt+1(µ |ot+1,at ,ξt)dµ (6.5)
We shall denote the set of BAPOMDPs with MBP. Again, (6.5) simply assures that
the transitions in the belief-POMDP are well-defined. The Markov state ξt(µ ,st)
now jointly specifies a distribution over POMDPs and states.6 As in the MDP case,
in order to be able to evaluate policies and select actions optimally, we need to first
construct the BAPOMDP. This requires calculating the transitions from the current
belief state to subsequent ones according to our possible future observations, as
well as the probability of those observations. The next section goes into this in
more detail.
6.2 The belief state
In order to simplify the exposition, in the following we shall assume firstly that
each POMDP has the same number of states. Then ξ (st = s|µ) describes the prob-
ability that we are in state s at time t given some belief ξ and assuming we are in
the POMDP µ . Similarly, ξ (st = s,µ) is the joint probability given our belief. This
joint distribution can be used as a state in an expanded MDP, which can be solved
via backward induction, as will be seen later. In order to do this, we must start
with an initial belief ξ0 and calculate all possible subsequent beliefs. The belief
at time t + 1 depends only on the belief time t and the current set of observations
rt+1,ot+1,at . Thus, the transition probability from ξt to ξt+1 is just the probability
of the observations according to our current belief, ξt(rt+1,ot+1|at). This can be
calculated by first noting that given the model and the state, the probability of the
observations no longer depends on the belief, i.e.
ξt(rt+1,ot+1, | st ,at ,µ) = µ(rt+1,ot+1 | at ,st) = µ(rt+1 | at ,st)µ(ot+1 | at ,st).
(6.6)
The probability of any particular observation can be obtained by integrating over
all the possible models and states
ξt(rt+1,ot+1 | at) =
∫
MP
∫
S
µ(rt+1,ot+1 | at ,st)ξt(µ ,st)dµdst . (6.7)
Given that a particular observation is made from a specific belief state, we now
need to calculate what belief state it would lead to. For this we need to compute
the posterior belief over POMDPs and states. The belief over POMDPs is given by
ξt+1(µ) , ξt(µ | rt+1,ot+1,at ,) (6.8)
=
ξt(rt+1,ot+1,at | µ)ξt(µ)
ξt(rt+1,ot+1,at) (6.9)
=
ξt(µ)
Z
∫∫
S
µ(rt+1,ot+1,at | st+1,st)ξt(st+1,st | µ)dst+1dst (6.10)
6The formalism is very similar to that described in Ross et al. [2008a], with the exception that we do not
include the actual POMDP state in the model.
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where Z = ξt(rt+1,ot+1,at) is a normalizing constant. Note that ξt(st+1,st | µ) =
µ(st+1 | st)ξt(st | µ), where ξt(st | µ) is our belief about the state in the POMDP
µ . This can be updated using the following two steps. Firstly, the filtering step
ξt+1(st | µ) , ξt(st | rt+1,ot+1,at ,µ) (6.11)
=
µ(rt+1,ot+1 | st ,at)ξt(st | µ)
ξt(rt+1,ot+1 | at ,µ) , (6.12)
where we adjust our belief about the previous state of the MDP based on. Then we
must perform a prediction step
ξt+1(st+1 | µ) =
∫
S
µ(st+1 | st = s)ξt+1(st = s | µ)ds, (6.13)
where we calculate the probability over the current states given our new belief
concerning the previous states. These predictions can be used to further calculate a
new possible belief, since our current belief corresponds to a distribution over MP.
For each for each possible µ we determine how our beliefs would change as we
acquire new observations. The main difficulty is maintaining the joint distribution
over states and POMDPs.
6.3 Belief compression
Belief-augmented POMDPs in generally admit no compact representation of our
current belief. This is due to the fact that there is a uncertainty both about which
POMDP we are acting in and about the state of each possible POMDP. In fact, the
sufficient statistic for such a problem consists of the complete history of observa-
tions.
This problem is not unique in reinforcement learning, however. A lot of other
inference problems admit no compact posterior distributions. Gaussian processes [Ras-
mussen and Williams, 2006], for example, have complexity O(n3) in the number
of parameters n.
For the specific case of BAPOMDPs, Ross et al [Ross et al., 2008a] give a
fixed-sample approximation for the value function with a strict upper bound on
the error. This work uses the idea of α-vector backups employed in Poupart et al.
[2006] to evaluate the BAMDP value function on a finite POMDP. In addition
to the value function approximation, the authors also employ particle filters to
represent the belief. In very closely related work, Poupart and Vlassis [Poupart and
Vlassis, 2008] employ sampling from reachable beliefs together with an efficient
analytical approximation to the BAPOMDP value function.
7 Conclusion, future directions and open prob-
lems
Online methods for reinforcement learning have now reached a point of relative
maturity, especially in the distribution-free framework. Methods for nearly opti-
mal reinforcement learning now exist in the discrete case Auer et al. [2008]. The
continuous case is covered only for bandit problems, however Auer et al. [2007];
Coquelin and Munos [2007]; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri [2006]. The continuous-case
extension of the discrete framework may be relatively straightforward, but it is
nevertheless unclear whether a naive extension (by a simple discretisation) of the
bounds in Auer et al. [2008] will be sufficient. Related results in policy learning in
continuous spaces Dimitrakakis and Lagoudakis [2008] show an exponential de-
pendency on the number of dimensions, even though the policy iteration procedure
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used therein is quite efficient. This however is probably due to the generic weak-
ness that interval-based methods have with dealing with high dimensional spaces:
they require a number of partitionings of the state space exponential in the number
of dimensions. Whether such methods can be further improved remains to be seen.
There are some approaches which use sparse sampling Kearns and Singh [1998]
to deal with this problem. These methods have been employed in a Bayesian online
settings as well Wang et al. [2005], with promising results. Such methods, how-
ever, are unuseful when rewards are undiscounted: Kearn’s sparse sampling Kearns
and Singh [1998] method relies on the fact that the discount factor acts as an im-
plicit horizon. It is possible to employ average-reward value iteration (see for
example Puterman [2005]) to obtain upper bounds on the optimal value function
at the leaf nodes of such a tree. However, the main problem with that approach is
that the average-reward value iteration in general diverges: thus, there is no easy
way to calculate the value of predecessor states.
Current research to improve the performance in the online case is mostly fo-
cused on improved methods for tree search Coquelin and Munos [2007]; Dim-
itrakakis [2008, 2009]; Hren and Munos [2008]; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri [2006];
Ross et al. [2008b]; Wang et al. [2005]. Offline methods have been explored in the
context of point-based approximations to analytic solutions Poupart et al. [2006],
as well as in the context of linear programming Castro and Precup [2007]. Both
approaches could be effective tools to reduce computation, by allowing one to gen-
eralize over belief states. This is an approach followed by Ross et al Ross et al.
[2008a] and Poupart and Vlassis [Poupart and Vlassis, 2008] for exploration in
POMDPs.
In summary, the following questions should be of interest to researchers in the
field: (a) How well do value function approximations on BA(PO)MDPs generalize
to unseen belief states? (b) How to perform an effective discretisation of the con-
tinuous space. Can we go beyond interval-based methods? (c) How can we sample
MDP and belief states efficiently? (d) Can Bayesian methods be extended to the
undiscounted case?
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Appendix
Proposition 5.1 By definition, V ∗(ω)≥V pi (ω) for all ω = (s,ξ ), for any policy
pi . The lower bound follows trivially, since
V pi
∗(µ¯ξ )(ω) ,
∫
V pi
∗(µ¯ξ )
µ (s)ξ (µ)dµ . (7.1)
The upper bound is derived as follows. First note that for any function f , maxx
∫ f (x,u)du≤∫
maxx f (x,u)du. Then, we remark that:
V ∗(ω) = max
pi
∫
V piµ (s)ξ (µ)dµ (7.2a)
≤
∫
max
pi
V piµ (s)ξ (µ)dµ (7.2b)
=
∫
V pi
∗(µ)
µ (s)ξ (µ)dµ. (7.2c)
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